2018 (40c) : Montessori , Derrida , Montessori , Derrida , Genesis 35:19-20 , Bhagavad Gita 4:38

There is another fact : certain senseless fears and
nervous ‘ habits which we find in adults can be traced
to violence to the child’s sensitivity. Some of ; the sense-
less fears concern animals, cats and hens ; some concern
remaining in a room with the doors closed, etc. No
reasoning, no persuasion can help the victims of these
fears. I once had a colleague, a Professor of Pedagogy
in a University of Italy. She was forty-five years old and
she came to me one day and said : ” You are a doctor
and will understand. Every time I see a hen I am
terribly frightened, I have to make an effort not to shriek.
I tell nobody ; they would laugh at me/’ Perhaps, as a
tiny girl of two and a half years, she went to fondle a
fluffy baby-chick and met the sudden agitated frenzy of
the watchful mother-hen. The feathered fury of that hen
gave her a shock which remained. These kinds of un-
reasonable fears are included under the name phobias ;
some are so common that they have special names such
as claustrophobia (the fear of closed doors, of a confined
space). Many more examples could be given if we
entered the field of medicine. 1 mention them to illustrate
the mental form of children of this age.
(Montessori)

it is not a limit . . . of a knowledge, the limit in the progression of a knowledge. It is, in some way, a structural non-knowing, which is heterogeneous, foreign to knowledge. It’s not just the unknown that could be known and that I give up trying to know. It is something in relation to which knowledge is out of the question. And when I specify that is is a non-knowing and not the secret, I mean that when a text appears to be crypted, it is not at all in order to calculate or to intrigue or to bar access to something that I know and that others must not know; it is a more ancient, more originary experience, if you will, of the secret. It is not a thing, some information that I am hiding or that one has to hide or dissimulate; it is rather an experience that does not make itself available to information, that resists information and knowledge, and that immediately encrypts itself. (Derrida)

Our action is not reflected merely in a sweet or
naughty child, but in the adult who will result from this
child. Therefore, I repeat, this epoch of the child’s life is
very important for the rest of his life and for humanity ;
it must be studied. This study is very important, but it
hardly exists as yet. It is necessary to embark on this
path, which is a path of discovery. It is necessary to try
and penetrate into the mind of the child, as the psycho-
analyst penetrates into the sub-conscious of the adult.
It is difficult because we often do not understand their
language, or if we do, we don’t understand the meaning
they give to the words they use. Sometimes it is
necessary also to know the rest of the life of the child ; it
is a sort of research work or detective work, but a
research work of great utility because through it we
bring peace to this difficult period. We need a translator,
an interpreter of the child and his language, and this
interpretation will allow us to understand the child’s
state of mind. I myself have worked in this sense and
tried to become the interpreter of the child and it has
been curious to see how the children run to this inter-
preter, because they realize there is someone who can
help them. This eagerness of the child is something
entirely different from the affection of the child who is
petted or caressed. The interpreter is to the child a great
hope, someone who will open to him the path of dis-covery when the world had already closed its doors. This helper is taken into the closest relationship, a rela- tionship that is more than affection because help is given,
not merely consolation. (Montessori)

Without writing, un-writing, the unwritten switches over to a question of reading on a board or tablet which you perhaps are. You are a board or a door; we will see much later how a word can address itself, indeed confide itself to a door, count on a door open to the other. (Derrida)

19 So Rachel died and was buried on the way to Ephrath (that is, Bethlehem). 20 Over her tomb Jacob set up a pillar, and to this day that pillar marks Rachel’s tomb. (Genesis 35:19-20)

In this world, there is nothing as purifying as divine knowledge. One who has attained purity of mind through prolonged practice of Yoga, receives such knowledge within the heart, in due course of time.
(Bhagavad Gita 4:38)

2018 (40b) : Montessori , Derrida , Montessori , Derrida , Bhagavad Gita 4:37 , Genesis 35:16-18

The sensitivity of the child presents various aspects,
but some things are common to all. One is a sensitivity
to shocks at this period. Another common feature is
sensitivity to the calm but cold, determined effort of the
adult to prevent outer manifestations of children : ” You
mustn’t do this ! ” ” It is not done “. Those who have
the good fortune (!) to have what is called a well-trained
nurse for their children should especially beware of this
tendency in her ; she very often has it. That is why
this type of impediment is so frequent among aristocrats,
they do not lack physical courage, but when they speak
they stutter and stammer. I wish to stress this question
of violence. It must be understood from the child’s
point of view, and we must be very delicate in our
behaviour. (Montessori)

“(A deconstructionist reading) would mean respect for that which cannot be eaten—respect for that in a text which cannot be assimilated. My thoughts on the limits of eating follow in their entirety the same schema as my theories on the indeterminate or untranslatable in a text. There is always a remainder that cannot be read, that must remain alien. This residue can never be interrogated as the same, but must be constantly sought out anew, and must continue to be written.” (Derrida)

It has happened to me to be violent to children
and I have given an example in one of my books. 1 A
child put his pair of outdoor shoes on the nice silk cover-
let of his bed. I removed them very determinedly, put them
on the floor and brushed the coverlet vigorously with my
hand, to demonstrate that it was not the place for shoes.
For two or three months after that, whenever the child
saw a pair of shoes, he changed their position and then
looked round for some silk coverlet or cushion to clean.
The answer of the child to my too vigorous (violent)
lesson, was not a crude, rebellious spirit. He did not
say : ” Do not talk, I will put my shoes where I like ! “,
but an abnormal development. The child is so often
non-violent in his reactions. 1 wish he were not, rebellion
would be better than taking the faulty path to anomalies.
The child with tantrums has found out how to defend
himself and may arrive at normal development, but when
a child responds by changing his character, this affects his
whole life. Yet people take no notice of this, they only
worry about tantrums ! (Montessori)

And this question would be a question of life or death, the question of life-death, before being a question of Being, of essence, or of existence. It would open onto a dimension of irreducible sur-vival or surviving [survivance] and onto Being and onto some opposition between living and dying. (Derrida)

As a kindled fire reduces wood to ashes, O Arjun, so does the fire of knowledge burn to ashes all reactions from material activities.
(Bhagavad Gita 4:37)

16 Then they moved on from Bethel. While they were still some distance from Ephrath, Rachel began to give birth and had great difficulty. 17 And as she was having great difficulty in childbirth, the midwife said to her, “Don’t despair, for you have another son.” 18 As she breathed her last—for she was dying—she named her son Ben-Oni.[h] But his father named him Benjamin.
(Genesis 35:16-18)

2018 (40a) : Montessori , Derrida , John 13:6-8

I NOW wish to deal with certain inner sensitivities, so
that we may understand the hidden tendencies of the
child. We might compare this to a sort of psycho-
analysis of the invisible mind of the child.
(Montessori)

I have constantly insisted on the fact that the movement of deconstruction was first of all affirmative – not positive, but affirmative. Deconstruction, let’s say it one more time, is not demolition or destruction. Deconstruction – I don’t know if it is something, but if it is something, it is also a thinking of Being, of metaphysics, thus a discussion that has it out with [“s’explique avec”] the authority of Being or of essence, of the thinking of what is, and such a discussion or explanation cannot be simply a negative destruction. All the more so in that, among all the things in the history of metaphysics that deconstruction argues against [“s’explique avec”], there is the dialectic, there is the “opposition” of the negative to the positive. To say that deconstruction is negative is simply to reinscribe it in an intrametaphysical process. The point is not to remove oneself from this process but to give it the possibility of being thought. (Derrida)

There must be a preparation for this. It is hidden,
a secret, but though it is secret it is not a hypothesis,
because the results indicate efforts. One can realize the
great efforts the child has had to make in order to express
his thoughts. As adults do not always understand what
the child means, at this stage there is the rage and
agitation I mentioned before. This agitation forms an
integral part of the life of children. All the efforts which
the child will carry out, if not crowned with success, will
produce agitation. It is a known fact that the deaf and
dumb are often quarrelsome. The explanation lies in
their inability to express their thoughts. There is an
inner wealth and richness which tries to find expression ;
it does so in the ordinary child, but amidst great diffi-
culties. (Montessori)

That is what deconstruction is made of: not the mixture but the tension between memory, fidelity, the preservation of something that has been given to us, and, at the same time, heterogeneity, something absolutely new, and a break. The condition of this performative success, which is never guaranteed, is the alliance of these to newness. (Derrida)

There is a period of difficulties which we must take
into consideration ; difficulties caused by the environment
and by the child’s own limitations. This is the second diffi-
cult period of adaptation, the first was that of birth when
the child was suddenly called upon to function for himself,
whilst his mother had hitherto done it for him. We saw
then, that unless great care and understanding were shown,
birth terror affected the child and caused regressions.
Certain children are stronger than others, certain others
have a more favourable environment, and these go straight
to independence, the path of normal development, with-
out regressions. A parallel situation is seen at this period.
The conquest of language is a laborious conquest towards
a greater independence, and it ends in the freedom of
language, but there are parallel dangers of regression too.
(Montessori)

Let us not begin at the beginning, nor even at the archive.
But rather at the word “archive”-and with the archive of so familiar a word. Arkhe we recall, names at once the commencement and the commandment. This name apparently coordinates two principles in one: the principle according to nature or history, there where things commence-physical, historical, or ontological principle-but also the principle according to the law, there where men and gods command, there where authority, social order are exercised, in this place from which order is given-nomological principle.
There, we said, and in this place. How are we to think of there? And this taking place or this having a place, this taking the place one has of the arkhe?
(Derrida)

We must also remember another characteristic of
this creative period, viz., every impression and the result of
it has a tendency to remain permanently registered. This
is true for the sounds and for grammar. Children taking
in knowledge now retain it for the rest of their life ; so
also if there are obstacles at this period their effect
will remain permanently. This is the characteristic of
every epoch of creation. A struggle, fright or other
obstacles, may produce effects that remain for the rest of
life, since the reactions to those obstacles are absorbed like
everything else in development. (In the same way if there
is a spot of light on the photographic film we mentioned
above, all the prints of that film will show that spot.)
In this epoch therefore we have not only a development
of the character, but also a development of certain
deviated psychic characteristics which children will mani-
fest as they grow older. Knowledge of the mother-
tongue and the faculty of walking are acquired at this
epoch of the child’s life, during the creative period which
goes beyond the age of two and a half years, but
is then less strong. The acquisition of these two faculties
takes place now, but their growth and development
continue afterwards. So also it is with any defects and
obstacles acquired now ; they remain, and grow ; and
so many defects that adult people present are attributed
to this distant epoch of their life. (Montessori)

…ecstasy between the inside and the outside, of house and country, of source and mouth, of river and our Mediterranean, on this shore of introjection and incorporation… (Derrida)

The difficulties that mar normal development are
included in the term repression, (this term is particularly
used in psycho-analysis, but also in psychology generally).
These repressions, now known to the general public,
refer to this age in childhood. Examples of these repres-
sions may be given in connection with language itself,
though there are many more having a relationship with
other human activities. The mass of words that explodes
must have a form of emission. Also when the explosion
of sentences occurs and a child gives regular form to his
thoughts there must be freedom of expression. Great
emphasis is laid on freedom of expression, because it is
not only connected with the immediate present of the
developing mechanism, but also with the future life of the
individual. There have been certain cases where, at the
age when the explosion should take place, nothing
occurred ; at more than three or three and a half years
the child still used only the few words of a much earlier
age and appeared as a dumb child, although his organs
of speech were perfectly normal. This is called * psychic
mutism * and it has a purely psychological cause, it is a
psychic illness. This is the epoch of the origin of psychic
illnesses and psycho-analysis (which is really a branch of
medicine) studies them. Sometimes psychic mutism dis-
appears suddenly like a miracle ; a child speaks suddenly,
well and completely, with a full grasp of grammar, as he
is already prepared inwardly, only the expression had
been hindered by some obstacle. We have had children
in our schools of three and four years of age who had
never spoken and then suddenly spoke. They had never
even spoken the words of the two-year old, they were
absolutely dumb and then suddenly they spoke. By
allowing them free activity and a stimulating environ-
ment, they suddenly manifested this power. Why does
this happen ? Because either a great shock or persistent
opposition has impeded the child hitherto from giving
forth the wealth of his language. (Montessori)

a whole chemistry of information largely under the sway of unconscious drives, as well as affects and phantasms that were already in place before calculation,
(Derrida)

6 He came to Simon Peter, who said to him, “Lord, are you going to wash my feet?”

7 Jesus replied, “You do not realize now what I am doing, but later you will understand.”

8 “No,” said Peter, “you shall never wash my feet.”

Jesus answered, “Unless I wash you, you have no part with me.”

(John 13:6-8)

2018 (39f): Derrida

“I have constantly insisted on the fact that the movement of deconstruction was first of all affirmative – not positive, but affirmative. Deconstruction, let’s say it one more time, is not demolition or destruction. Deconstruction – I don’t know if it is something, but if it is something, it is also a thinking of Being, of metaphysics, thus a discussion that has it out with [“s’explique avec”] the authority of Being or of essence, of the thinking of what is, and such a discussion or explanation cannot be simply a negative destruction. All the more so in that, among all the things in the history of metaphysics that deconstruction argues against [“s’explique avec”], there is the dialectic, there is the “opposition” of the negative to the positive. To say that deconstruction is negative is simply to reinscribe it in an intrametaphysical process. The point is not to remove oneself from this process but to give it the possibility of being thought.” (Derrida)

“However affirmative deconstruction is, it is affirmative in a way that is not simply positive, not simply conservative, not simply a way of repeating the given institution. I think that the life of an institution implies that we are able to criticize, to transform, to open the institution to its own future. The paradox in the instituting moment of an institution is that, at the same time that it starts something new, it also continues something, is true to the memory of the past, to a heritage, to something we receive from the past, from our predecessors, from the culture. If an institution is to be an institution, it must to some extent break with the past, keep the memory of the past, while inaugurating something absolutely new.” (Derrida)

“That is what deconstruction is made of: not the mixture but the tension between memory, fidelity, the preservation of something that has been given to us, and, at the same time, heterogeneity, something absolutely new, and a break. The condition of this performative success, which is never guaranteed, is the alliance of these to newness.” (Derrida)

Let us not begin at the beginning, nor even at the archive.
But rather at the word “archive”-and with the archive of so familiar a word. Arkhe we recall, names at once the commencement and the commandment. This name apparently coordinates two principles in one: the principle according to nature or history, there where things commence-physical, historical, or ontological principle-but also the principle according to the law, there where men and gods command, there where authority, social order are exercised, in this place from which order is given-nomological principle.
There, we said, and in this place. How are we to think of there? And this taking place or this having a place, this taking the place one has of the arkhe?
(Derrida)

…ecstasy between the inside and the outside, of house and country, of source and mouth, of river and our Mediterranean, on this shore of introjection and incorporation… (Derrida)

6 He came to Simon Peter, who said to him, “Lord, are you going to wash my feet?”

7 Jesus replied, “You do not realize now what I am doing, but later you will understand.”

8 “No,” said Peter, “you shall never wash my feet.”

Jesus answered, “Unless I wash you, you have no part with me.”

a whole chemistry of information largely under the sway of unconscious drives, as well as affects and phantasms that were already in place before calculation,
(Derrida)

“… this institution of fiction which gives in principle the power to say everything, to break free of the rules, to displace them, and thereby to institute, to invent and even to suspect the traditional difference between nature and institution, nature and conventional law, nature and history. Here we should ask juridical and political questions.” (Derrida)

” … like a piece in a borderless fiction, neither public nor private, with and without a general narrator.” (Derrida)

“This condensation of history, of language, of the encyclopedia, remains here indissociable from an absolutely singular event, an absolutely singular signature, and therefore also of a date, of a language, of an autobiographical inscription. In a minimal autobiographical trait can be gathered the greatest potentiality of historical, theoretical, linguistic, philosophical culture — that’s really what interests me. I am not the only one to be interested by this economic power. I try to understand its laws but also to mark in what regard the formalization of these laws can never be closed or completed.” (Derrida)

“Hospitality — this is is a name or an example of deconstruction.”

“… the subject as hostage, vulnerable subject subjected to substitution, to trauma, persecution, and obsession.”

“This visitation of Yahweh is so radically surprising and over-taking that he who receives does not even receive it himself, in his name. His identity is as if fractured. He receives without being ready to welcome since he is no longer the same between the moment at which God initiates the visit and the moment at which, visiting to him, he speaks to him. This is indeed hospitality par excellence in which the visitor radically overwhelms the self of the ‘visited’ and the chez-soi of the host. For as you know these visitations and announcements will begin with changes of names, heteronomous changes, unilaterally decided by God (Derrida)

“I have become increasingly interested in the philosophical border between man and animal, which also becomes an examination of the traditional boundary between culture and nature. I have chosen to tackle this issue via the thinkers who seem to have questioned the self-sufficiency of humanism most deeply: Heidegger and Lévinas. Despite their critique of a traditional concept of the subject, they remain humanists by insisting on an absolute distinction between humans and animals. The establishment of man’s privileged position requires the sacrifice and devouring of animals. Not even Lévinas is willing to sacrifice the sacrifice.” (Derrida)

“(A deconstructionist reading) would mean respect for that which cannot be eaten—respect for that in a text which cannot be assimilated. My thoughts on the limits of eating follow in their entirety the same schema as my theories on the indeterminate or untranslatable in a text. There is always a remainder that cannot be read, that must remain alien. This residue can never be interrogated as the same, but must be constantly sought out anew, and must continue to be written.” (Derrida)

“it is not a limit . . . of a knowledge, the limit in the progression of a knowledge. It is, in some way, a structural non-knowing, which is heterogeneous, foreign to knowledge. It’s not just the unknown that could be known and that I give up trying to know. It is something in relation to which knowledge is out of the question. And when I specify that is is a non-knowing and not the secret, I mean that when a text appears to be crypted, it is not at all in order to calculate or to intrigue or to bar access to something that I know and that others must not know; it is a more ancient, more originary experience, if you will, of the secret. It is not a thing, some information that I am hiding or that one has to hide or dissimulate; it is rather an experience that does not make itself available to information, that resists information and knowledge, and that immediately encrypts itself. (Derrida)

“Without writing, un-writing, the unwritten switches over to a question of reading on a board or tablet which you perhaps are. You are a board or a door; we will see much later how a word can address itself, indeed confide itself to a door, count on a door open to the other.” (Derrida)

“Death, the ‘proper result’ and therefore the end of life, the end without end, the strategy without finality of the living — all of this is not solely a statement of Schopenheur’s. It also coincides almost literally with several Nietzschean propositions that we had attempted to interpret: on life as a very rare genre of that which is dead (Joyful Wisdom), a ‘particular case’ and ‘means in view of something else’ (Will to Power), this something necessarily participating in death; and finally on the absence, in the last analysis, of anything like an instinct of conservation. The unconscious port of registry, at the distance of this generality, also will have been Nietzschean.”(Derrida)

In this world only the play of artists and children exhibits becoming and passing away, building and destroying, without any moral additive, in forever equal innocence. And as artists and children play, so plays the ever-living fire, building up and destroying, in innocence. Such is the game that the aeon plays with itself. It builds towers of sand like a child at the seashore, piling them up and trampling them down. From time to time it starts the game anew. A moment of satiety, and again it is seized by its need, as the artist is seized by the need to create. Not hubris but the ever-newly-awakened impulse to play calls new worlds into being. (Nietzsche)

… knowing that it took place but never, according to the strange turn of the event of nothing, what can be got around or not which comes back to me without ever having taken place, I call it circumcision, see the blood but also what comes, cauterization, coagulation or not, strictly contain the outpouring of circumcision, one circumcision, mine, the only one, rather than circumnavigation or circumference, although the unforgettable circumcision has carried me to the place I had to go to, and circumfession if I want to say and so something of an avowal without truth turning around itself, an avowal without “hymn” (hymnology) and without “virtue” (aretalogy), without managing to close itself on its possibility, unsealing abandoning the circle open, wandering on the periphery, taking the pulse of an encircling phrase, the pulsion of the paragraph which never circumpletes itself, as long as the blood, what I call thus and thus call, continues its venue in its vein. (Derrida)

The reality principle coincided with a determinate phase of the law of value. Today, the entire system is fluctuating in indeterminacy, all of reality absorbed by the hyperreality of the code and of simulation. It is now a principle of simulation, and not of reality, that regulates social life.
(Baudrillard)

“analysis as untangling, untying, detaching, freeing, even liberation — and thus also, let us not forget, as solution. The Greek word analuein, as is well known, means to untie and thus to dissolve the link. It can thus be rigorously approached, if not translated, by the Latin solvere (to detach, deliver, absolve, or acquit). Both solutio and resolutio have the sense of dissolution, dissolved tie, extrication, disengagement, or acquittal (for example, from debt) and that of solution of a problem: explanation or unveiling. The solutio linguae is also the tongue untied.” (Derrida)

“It calls upon the reader as witness in the way one might address oneself to a confessor or to some transferential addresse, some would say to an analyst, assuming that the reader is not always an analyst. Freud,then, has the premonition (Ich ahne) that something exceeds the analysis. The interpretation, the analytic deciphering, the Deutung of a certain fragment did not go far enough: a hidden meaning (verborgenne Sinn) exceeds the analysis.” (Derrida)

“things will get more complicated later on, notably in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, which will also complicate, as we shall see, the question of sense.”
(Derrida)

“Resistance must be interpreted; it has as much meaning as what it opposes; it is just as charged with meaning and thus just as interpretable as that which it disguises or displaces: in truth, it has the same meaning, but dialectically or polemically adverse, if one can say that… If, however, resistance is not lifted by the revelation of its meaning, then, beyond all these discursive and intellectual situations that belong to the order of consciousness, it can only be lifted by the intervention of an affective factor.” (Derrida)

“The inability to gather oneself, to identify with oneself, to unify oneself, all of this is perhaps tragedy itself, but it is also (the) chance and if there is no reason to dramatize, it is not only because that serves no purpose but also because it has not the least pertinence for this alliance of destiny, namely tragedy, and chance as the possible or the aleatory.” (Derrida)

“it has no meaning (death drive) and it resists analysis in the form of nonresistance, for the primary reason that it is itself of an analytic structure or vocation. Some would be tempted to infer from this that psychoanalysis is homogeneous to it and that psychoanalytic theory, treatment, and institution represent the death drive or the repetition compulsion at work.”
(Derrida)

“What is called “deconstruction” undeniably obeys an analytic exigency, at once critical and analytic. It is always a matter of undoing, desedimenting, decomposing, deconstituting sediments, artefacta, presuppositions, institutions.” (Derrida)

“and all this deconstruction is also a logic of the spectral and of haunting, or surviving, neither present nor absent, alive nor dead.” (Derrida)

“pure life or pure death: for me, it’s the same thing and everything I say goes as much against a philosophy of life as against its simple contrary.” (Derrida)

“What is getting archived! That is not a question. It is once again an exclamation, with a somewhat suspended exclamation point because it is always difficult to know if it is getting archived, what is getting archived, how it is getting archived — the trace that arrives only to efface itself / only by effacing itself, beyond the alternative of presence and absence. It is not merely difficult to know this; it is strictly impossible, no doubt not because there is always more to be known but because it is not of the order of knowledge, This is never a sufficient reason not to seek to know, as an Aufklarer — to know that it is getting archived, aithin what limits, and how, according to what detoured, surprising, or overdetermined paths.” (Derrida)

Not to say yes or no to reality except maybe occasionally, testing it with a foot, like a good dancer; to always feel kissed with a ray of sunlight and happiness (Nietzsche)

What should the language be such that seeing it and falling into it would be the same event? (Derrida)

to be filled with joy and always feel stimulated, even by affliction, since affliction upholds the happy man, and to see even in the most sacred things something comical. (Nietzsche)

it leaves the trace of an affirmation … it speaks! to all, to the other … the ambiguous force. and it speaks of what provokes it. (Derrida)

this sense of the continual fertility of the mother-site (an androgynous mixture of stars and sky). (Derrida)

we will have to circle around this appearance… and it is a question of offering.
(Derrida)

summed up in the word ‘seed’ , stars as seeds. the star-seeds will be linked with male and female milk. (Derrida)

through a process of transformation you will be able to follow, which stops to explain itself periodically, from quarter to quarter, sometimes fixing its mutations and reversals in some new schema. (Derrida)

Holds in reserve and exposes to view. (Derrida)

The reality principle imposes no definitive inhibition, no renunciation of pleasure, only a detour in order to defer enjoyment, the way station of a differance.Because the pleasure principle — right from this preliminary moment when Freud grants it an uncontested mastery — enters into a contract only with itself, reckons and speculates only with itself or with its own metastasis, because it sends itself everything it wants, and in sum encounters no opposition, it unleashes in itself the absolute other.(Derrida)

How shall we hear this name of abyss about which we will see that it opens up on the name itself, the name of name, and the name of which returns so often to the letter? (Derrida)

We have there two orders of order: sequential and jussive. From this point on, a series of cleavages will incessantly divide every atom of our lexicon. Already in the arkhe of the commencement, I alluded to the commencement according to nature or according to history, introducing surreptitiously a chain of belated and problematic oppositions between physis and its others, thesis, tekhne, nomos, etc., which are found to be at work in the other principle, the nomological principle of the arkhe, the principle of the commandment. All would be simple if there were one principle or two principles. All would be simple if the physis and each one of its others were one or two. As we have suspected for a long time, it is nothing of the sort, yet we are forever forgetting this. There is always more than one-and more or less than two. In the order of the commencement as well as in the order of the commandment. (Derrida)

As is the case for the Latin archivum or archium (a word that is used in the singular, as was the French “archive,” formerly employed as a masculine singular: “un archive”), the meaning of “archive,” its only meaning, comes to it from the Greek arkheion: initially a house, a domicile, an address, the residence of the superior magistrates, the archons, those who commanded. The citizens who thus held and signified political power were considered to possess the right to make or to represent the law. On account of their publicly recognized authority, it is at their home, in that place which is their house (private house, family house, or employee’s house), that official documents are filed. The archons are first of all the documents’ guardians. They do not only ensure the physical security of what is deposited and of the substrate. They are also accorded the hermeneutic right and competence. They have the power to interpret the archives. Entrusted to such archons, these documents in effect state the law: they recall the law and call on or impose the law. To be guarded thus, in the jurisdiction of this stating the law, they needed at once a guardian and a localization. Even in their guardianship or their hermeneutic tradition, the archives could neither do without substrate nor without residence. (Derrida)

“Multiplicity and migration of languages, certainly, and within language itself, Babel within a single language … multiplicity within language, insignificant difference as the condition of meaning. But by the same token, the insignificance of language, of the properly linguistic body : it can only take on meaning in relation to a place. By place, I mean just as much the relation to a border, country, house, or threshold, as any site, any situation in general from within which, practically, pragmatically, alliances are formed, contracts, codes and conventions established which give meaning to the insignificant , institute passwords, bend language to what exceeds it, make of it a moment of gesture and of step, secondarize or ‘reject’ it in order to find it again.”
(Derrida)

“The expression “perpetual recurrence of the same thing” appears, between quotation marks, in the third chapter. Nietzsche’s name is not mentioned, but small matter. The passage concerns the existence in psychic life of an irresistible tendency to reproduction: this takes the form of a repetition no longer taking into account the pleasure principle, and even placing itself above the pleasure principle. In the fate neurosis this repetition has the characteristics of the demonic. the phantom of the demonic, and even of the diabolical, reappears measuredly in Beyond … Coming back — subject to a rhythm — this phantom deserves an analysis of the passages and the procedure, of everything that both makes him come back and conjures him up cadentially.”
(Derrida)

“Here, I am asking questions in the dark. Or in a penumbra, rather, the penumbra in which we keep ourselves when Freud’s un-analyzed reaches out its phosphorescent antennae. Reaches them out the unexpected structure of this text, of the movements within it which, it seems to me, do not correspond to any genre, to any philosophical or scientific model. Nor to any literary, poetic, or mythological model. These genres, models, codes are certainly present within the text, together or in turn, exploited, maneuvered, interpreted like pieces. But thereby overflowed. Such is the hypothesis or the athesis of the athesis.”
(Derrida)

they needed to diminish the stitches or reduce the knit of what they were working on. And for this dimunition, needles and hands had to work with two loops at once, or at least play with more than one.weaving a shroud by saving the lost threads (the lost sons) … (Derrida)

It is thus, in this domiciliation, in this house arrest, that archives take place. The dwelling, this place where they dwell permanently, marks this institutional passage from the private to the public, which does not always mean from the secret to the nonsecret. (It is what is happening, right here, when a house, the Freuds’ last house, becomes a museum: the passage from one institution to another.) With such a status, the documents, which are not always discursive writings, are only kept and classified under the title of the archive by virtue of a privileged topology. They inhabit this unusual place, this place of election where law and singularity intersect in privilege. At the intersection of the topological and the nomological, of the place and the law, of the substrate and the authority, a scene of domiciliation becomes at once visible and invisible. I stress this point for reasons which will, I hope, appear more clearly later. They all have to do with this topo-nomology, with this archontic dimension of domiciliation, with this archic, in truth patriarchic, function, without which no archive would ever come into play or appear as such. To shelter itself and sheltered, to conceal itself. This archontic function is not solely topo-nomological. It does not only require that the archive be deposited somewhere, on a stable substrate, and at the disposition of a legitimate hermeneutic authority. The archontic power, which also gathers the functions of unification, of identification, of classification, must be paired with what we will call the power of consignation.By consignation, we do not only mean, in the ordinary sense of the word, the act of assigning residence or of entrusting so as to put into reserve (to consign, to deposit), in a place and on a substrate, but here the act of consigning through gathering together signs. It is not only the traditional consignatio, that is, the written proof, but what all consignatio begins by presupposing. Consignation aims to coordinate a single corpus, in a system or a synchrony in which all the elements articulate the unity of an ideal configuration. In an archive, there should not be any absolute dissociation, any heterogeneity or secret which could separate (secernere), or partition, in an absolute manner. The archontic principle of the archive is also a principle of consignation, that is, of gathering together.
(Derrida)

Such difference without presence appears, or rather baffles the process of appearing, by disclosing any orderly time at the center of the present. The present is no longer a mother-form around which are gathered and differentiated the future (present) and the past (present). What is marked in this hymen between the future (desire) and the present (fulfillment), between the past (remembrance) and the present (perpetration), between the capacity and the act, etc., is only a series of temporal differences without any central present, without a present of which the past and future would be but modifications. Can we then go on speaking about time, tenses, and temporal differences? …
(Derrida)

It follows, certainly, that Freudian psychoanalysis proposes a new theory of the archive; it takes into account a topic and a death drive without which there would not in effect be any desire or any possibility for the archive. But at the same time, at once for strategic reasons and because the conditions of archivization implicate all the tensions, contradictions, or aporias we are trying to formalize here, notably those which make of it a movement of the promise and of the future no less than of recording the past, the concept of the archive must inevitably carry in itself, as does every concept, an unknowable weight. The presupposition of this weight also takes on the figures of “repression” and “suppression,” even if it can not necessarily be reduced to these. This double presupposition leaves an imprint. It inscribes an impression in language and in discourse. The unknowable weight which imprints itself thus does not weigh only as a negative charge. It involves the history of the concept, it inflects archive desire or fever, their opening on the future, their dependency with respect to what will come, in short, all that ties knowledge and memory to the promise. … (Derrida)

It goes without saying from now on that wherever one could attempt, and in particular in Freudian psychoanalysis, to rethink the place and the law according to which the archontic becomes instituted, wherever one could interrogate or contest, directly or indirectly, this archontic principle, its authority, its titles, and its genealogy, the right that it commands, the legality or the legitimacy that depends on it, wherever secrets and heterogeneity would seem to menace even the possibility of consignation, this can only have grave consequences for a theory of the archive, as well as for its institutional implementation. A science of the archive must include the theory of this institutionalization, that is to say, at once of the law which begins by inscribing itself there and of the right which authorizes it. This right imposes or supposes a bundle of limits which have a history, a deconstructable history, and to the deconstruction of which psychoanalysis has not been foreign, to say the least. This deconstruction in progress concerns, as always, the institution of limits declared to be insurmountable,’ whether they involve family or state law, the relations between the secret and the nonsecret, or, and this is not the same thing, between the private and the public, whether they involve property or access rights, publication or reproduction rights, whether they involve classification and putting into order: What comes under theory or under private correspondence, for example? What comes under system? under biography or autobiography? under personal or intellectual anamnesis? In works said to be theoretical, what is worthy of this name and what is not? Should one rely on what Freud says about this to classify his works? Should one for example take him at his word when he presents his Moses as a “historical novel”? In each of these cases, the limits, the borders, and the distinctions have been shaken by an earthquake from which no classificational concept and no implementation of the archive can be sheltered. Order is no longer assured. (Derrida)

“The very condition of a deconstruction may be at work in the work, within the system to be deconstructed. It may already be located there, already at work. Not at the center, but in an eccentric center, in a corner whose eccentricity assures the solid concentration of the system, participating in the construction of what it, at the same time, threatens to deconstruct. One might then be inclined to reach this conclusion: deconstruction is not an operation that supervenes afterwards, from the outside, one fine day. It is always already at work in the work. (Derrida)

Since the destructive force of Deconstruction is always already contained within the very architecture of the work, all one would finally have to do to be able to deconstruct, given this always already, is to do memory work. Yet since I want neither to accept nor to reject a conclusion formulated in precisely these terms, let us leave this question suspended for the moment.” (Derrida)

and this openness opens the unity, renders it possible, and forbids it totality. Its openness allows receiving and giving. (Derrida)

In their form and in their grammar, these questions are all turned toward the past: they ask if we already have at our disposal such a concept and if we have ever had any assurance in this regard. To have a concept at one’s disposal, to have assurances with regard to it, this presupposes a closed heritage and the guarantee which is sealed, in some sense, by this heritage. And the word and the notion of the archive seem at first, admittedly, to point toward the past, to refer to the signs of consigned memory, to recall faithfulness to tradition. If we have attempted to underline the past in these questions from the outset, it is also to indicate the direction of another problematic. As much as and more than a thing of the past, before such a thing, the archive should call into question the coming of the future … (Derrida)

The king has indeed a body (and it is not here the original text but that which constitutes the tenor of the translated text), but this body is only promised, announced and dissimulated by the translation. The clothes fit but do not cling strictly enough to the royal person. This is not a weakness; the best translation resembles this royal cape. (Derrida)

… a presence both perceived and not perceived, at once image and model, and hence image without model, neither image nor model, a medium (medium in the sense of middle, neither/nor, what is between extremes, and medium in the sense of element, either, matrix, means). When we have rounded a certain corner in our reading we will place ourselves on that side of the lustre where the “medium” is shining. (Derrida)

The question of the question is more vast and stems from procedures of translation and theoretico-practical issues that join up at the borders (of several disciplines) that they destabilize.(Derrida)

It follows, certainly, that Freudian psychoanalysis proposes a new theory of the archive; it takes into account a topic and a death drive without which there would not in effect be any desire or any possibility for the archive. But at the same time, at once for strategic reasons and because the conditions of archivization implicate all the tensions, contradictions, or aporias we are trying to formalize here, notably those which make of it a movement of the promise and of the future no less than of recording the past, the concept of the archive must inevitably carry in itself, as does every concept, an unknowable weight. The presupposition of this weight also takes on the figures of “repression” and “suppression,” even if it can not necessarily be reduced to these. This double presupposition leaves an imprint. It inscribes an impression in language and in discourse. The unknowable weight which imprints itself thus does not weigh only as a negative charge. It involves the history of the concept, it inflects archive desire or fever, their opening on the future, their dependency with respect to what will come, in short, all that ties knowledge and memory to the promise. (Derrida)

“… we need at the same time interdisciplinarity, crossing the borders, establishing new themes, new problems, new ways, new approaches to new problems, all the while teaching the history of philosophy, the techniques, professional rigor, what one calls discipline”

“… audacious philosophers who cross the borders and discover new connections, new fields, not only interdisciplinary researches but themes that are not even interdisciplinary.”

“When you discover a new object, an object that up until now has not been identified as such, or has no legitimacy in terms of academic fields, then you have to invent a new competency, a new type of research, a new discipline.” (8)

“I try to dismantle not institutions but some structures in given institutions which are too rigid or are dogmatic or which work as an obstacle to future research.”

2018 (39e) : Montessori , Heidegger , Derrida — Affirmative Deconstruction (Language, Children, Learning, Play, Being)

LET us consider the development of language in the
child. In order to understand language, we must reflect
on what language is. It is so fundamental that we might
well call it the basis of normal human life, because
through it men join together to form a group. It brings
about the transformation of the environment that we
call civilization. (Montessori)

Language is the house of Being, in its home man dwells. Those who think and those who create with words are the guardians of this home. (Heidegger)

What is necessary
is that we must understand one another. This under-
standing one another is possible only by means of langu-
age. Language is the instrument of thinking together.
Language did not not exist on the earth until man made
his appearance. Yet after all, what is it ? A mere breath,
a series of sounds put together not even logically, just put
together. (Montessori)

Man acts as though he were the shaper and master of language, while in fact language remains the master of man. (Heidegger)

That is why
language has become almost mystical, it is something
that unites groups of men even more than the ideas of
nationality. Men are united by language, and language
has become more complicated as man’s thought has
become more complicated ; it has grown with man’s
thought. (Montessori)

To reflect on language means—to reach the speaking of language in such a way that this speaking takes place as that which grants an abode for the being of mortals… What does this mean to speak? The current view declares that speech is the activation of the organs for sounding and hearing. Speech is the audible expression and communication of human feelings. These feelings are accompanied by thoughts. (Heidegger)

This problem is always worrying humanity, but it
mast be solved, because language has to be given to the
new-born child. Attention to this problem has led
people to consider and realize that it is the child who takes
in language. The reality of this absorption is something
very great and mysterious which men have not sufficiently
considered. It is said : ” Children are among people who
speak, so they speak”. This is a very profound state-
ment indeed ! especially when one considers the com-
plications. Yet people have gone on for thousands of
years to think of it so superficially. (Montessori)

“When we understand the nature of language in terms of expression, we give it a more comprehensive definition by incorporating expression, as one among many activities, into the total economy of those achievements by which man makes himself.”

“According to the opening of the Prologue of the Gospel of St. John, in the beginning the Word was with God. The attempt is made not only to free the question of origin from the fetters of rational-logical explanation, but also, to set aside the limits of a merely logical description of language…”
(Heidegger)

There is a period for all children
when only syllables are spoken ; then words are spoken
and finally the whole syntax and grammar is used in its
perfection. The differences of masculine and feminine,
of singular and plural, of tenses, of prefixes and suffixes,
all are used by children. The language may be com*
plicated and with many exceptions to the rules, yet the
child who absorbs it learns it all and can use it in the
same time as the African child learns the few words of
his primitive language. (Montessori)

“Language is the expression, produced by men, of their feelings and the world view that guides them… In it’s essence, language is neither expression nor an activity of man. Language speaks. Accordingly, what we seek lies in the poetry of the spoken word.” (Heidegger)

This construction is not the result of conscious work,
but takes place in the deepest layer of the sub-conscious
of the child. He begins this work in the darkness of
the sub-conscious and it is there that it develops and
fixes itself as a permanent acquisition. It is this that
lends interest to the study of language. We, adults, can
conceive only a conscious wish to learn a language and
set about to learn it consciously. We must however have
another conception of a natural, or rather supra-natural
mechanism that takes place outside of consciousness, and
this mechanism, or series of mechanisms, is fascinating.
They take place in a depth not directly accessible to
adult observers. Only the external manifestations can
be seen, but these are very clear in themselves if we
observe them properly, since they take place in all
humanity. Especially striking is the fact that the sounds
of any language keep their purity age after age ; another
curiosity is that complications are taken in as easily as
simplicities. No child becomes * tired’ of learning his
mother tongue, his mechanism elaborates his language
in its totality. (Montessori)

“Everyone knows that a poem is an invention. It is imaginative even where it seems to be descriptive. In his fictive act the poet pictures himself something that could be present in its presence… What is spoken in the poem is what the poet enunciates out himself. “

“…poetry inevitably linked the making involved in every individual’s own building and dwelling to other acts of making throughout history, aligned ultimately with the creation of the world and its mythologies… Poetry is what really lets us dwell.” (Heidegger)

So it is with the
psychic mechanism for language in the child. It begins
deep down in the darkness of the sub-conscious, is devel-
oped and fixed there, and then it is seen openly. Certain
it is that some mechanism does exist, (whether I have
made a good comparison or not) so that this under-
standing of language may be realized. Once one has
envisaged this mysterious activity, one wants to find out
how it happens ; so there is today a deep interest in the
investigation of this mysterious feature of the deep sub-
conscious. (Montessori)

“Language speaks. Language? And not man? What is it to speak?”

“Language speaks as the peal of stillness by carrying out, the bearing and enduring, of world and things in their presence… The peal of stillness is not anything human. But on the contrary, the human is indeed in its nature to speech… What has thus taken place, human being, has been brought into its own by language, the peal of stillness. Such an appropriating takes place in that the very nature, the presencing, of language needs and uses the speaking of the mortals in order to sound as the peal of stillness for the hearing of mortals. Only as men belong within the peal of stillness are mortals able to speak in their own way in sounds.” (Heidegger)

They have revealed the fact that there is a mysterious
inner development that is very great, while the corres-
ponding external manifestation is very small, so there is
evidently a great disproportion between the activity of
the inner life and the external expression. Another thing
that stands out in all these observations of outer mani-
festations is that there is not a regular linear develop-
ment, but development manifests itself in jerks. There
is the conquest of syllables, for instance, at a certain
time and then for months the child emits nothing but
syllables there is no progress externally. Then suddenly
he says a word ; then he remains with one or two words
for a long time. Again there seems no progress and one
feels almost disheartened to see this slow external
progress. It seems so sluggish, but the acts reveal to us
that in the inner life there is a continuous and great progress.
(Montessori)

“If attention is fastened exclusively on human speech, if human speech is taken simply to be the voicing of the inner man, if speech so conceived is regard as language itself, then the nature of language can never appear as anything but an expression and an activity of man. But human speech, as the speech if mortals, is not self-subsistent. The speech of mortals rests in its relation to the speaking of language.” (Heidegger)

If we look at history, we see that man for cen-
turies lived at the same level, primitive, stupid, conserva-
tive, incapable of progress ; but this is only the outer
manifestation seen in history. There is an inner growth
going on and on, until an explosion suddenly comes !
And then another period of placidity and little progress
externally and then another revelation ! (Montessori)

“Man speaks in that he responds to language. This responding is hearing. It hears because it listens to the command of stillness.” (Heidegger)

So it is with the child and this language of man.
There is not merely small steady progress of word by word,
but there are also explosive phenomena, as psychologists
call them, happening without reason or teaching. At the
same period of life in each child comes suddenly this
cataract of words, and all pronounced perfectly. In
three months the children use with ease all the com-
plications of nouns, suffixes and prefixes, and verbs. All
this happens at the end of the second year for every
child. So we must be heartened by this action of the
child and wait. (And at the sluggish epochs in history
we may hope for the same ; perhaps humanity is not so
stupid as it appears, perhaps wonderful things will
happen which will be explosions of internal life.) These
explosive phenomena and eruptions of expression con-
tinue after the age of two years ; the use of simple
and compound sentences, the use of the verb in all its
tenses and modes, even in the subjunctive, the use of
subordinate and co-ordinate clauses appear in the same
sudden explosive way. So is completed the expression
of the language of the group (race, social level, etc.,) to
which the child belongs. This treasure which has been prepared by the sub-conscious is handed over to the
consciousness, and the child, in full possession of this new
power, talks, and talks, and talks, till the adults say :
” For goodness* sake can’t you stop talking ! (Montessori)

“It is not a matter here of stating a new view of language. What is important is learning to live in the speaking of language. To do so, we need to examine constantly whether and to what extent we are capable of what genuinely belongs to responding: anticipation in reserve. For:

Man speaks only as he responds to language. Language speaks. Its speaking speaks for us in what has been spoken” (Heidegger)

After this great landmark at two and a half years,
which seems to indicate a border-line of intelligence when
man is formed, language still continues to develop, with-
out explosions, yet with great vivacity and spontaneity.
This second period lasts from two and a half to four and
a half or five years. This is the period when the child
takes in a great number of words, and perfects the
rendering of sentences. Certainly if the child is in an
environment of a few words or of * slang ‘, he will use
those words only, but if he lives in an environment of
cultured speech and rich vocabulary, the child will fix
it all. The environment is very important, yet in any
case an enrichment of vocabulary will come about*
Great interest is being taken in this fact. (Montessori)

What is, is never of our making or even merely the product of our own minds. (Heidegger)

We must keep clearly in mind this double path that
has been followed : that of the sub-conscious activity which
prepares the language, and then that of the consciousness
gradually coming to life and taking from the sub-conscious
what it has to give. And what have we at the end ?
MAN the child of five who can speak his language
well, knows and uses all the rules. He does not realize
all the sub-conscious work, but in reality he is MAN who
has created language. The child has created it for him-
self. If the child did not have these powers and did not
spontaneously acquire language, there would have been
no work possible in the world of men and no civilization.
We see, therefore, how important is MAN in this period of
his life : he constructs all. If it were not for him, civiliza-
tion would not exist, for he alone constructs its foundation.
So we should give him the help he needs and not leave
him to wander alone. (Montessori)

Teaching is even more difficult than learning. We
know that; but we rarely think about it. And why is teaching
more difficult than learning? Not because the teacher
must have a larger store of information, and have it always
ready. Teaching is more difficult than learning because
what teaching calls for is this: to let learn. The real teacher,
in fact, lets nothing else be learned than-learning. His conduct,
therefore, often produces the impression that we
properly learn nothing from him, if by “learning” we now
suddenly understand merely the procurement of useful information.
The teacher is ahead of his apprentices in this
alone, that he has still far more to learn than they-he
has to learn to let them learn. The teacher must be capable
of being more teachable than the apprentices. (Heidegger)

Let us imagine the ego in this mysterious period, just
after birth, as a sleeping self. This sleeping ego suddenly
wakes up and hears a delightful music. If this mysterious
ego could talk, it would say : ” I have entered the world,
and they have welcomed me with music, a music, so
divine, so soul-penetrating, that my whole being, my very
fibres have begun to vibrate to it. No other sound reached
me, because this reached my soul and I heard no other
sound but this divine call ! ” And if we remember the great
propulsive powers which create and conserve life, we can
see how this music produces a thing that remains ever-
lasting. What takes place in the mneme of the new-
born child now, remains for ever. Every group of
humanity loves music, creates its own music and its own
language. Each group responds to its music with move-
ments of the body and this music attaches itself to words,
but those words have no sense in themselves, it is we
who give the sense. In India there are many languages,
but music unites all. The impressions on the new-born
child have remained. There are no animals that make
music and dance, but all humanity does it wherever it is.
(Montessori)

In order to make apparent a play that is not comprehended in this philosophical or scientific space, one must think of play in another way. Indeed, this is what I am trying to do within what is already a tradition-that of Nietzsche, for example-but one which also has its genealogy. On the basis of thinking such as Nietzsche’s (as interpreted by (Eugen) Fink), the concept of play, understood as the play of the world, is no longer play· in the world. That is, it is no longer determined and contained by something, by the space that would comprehend it. I believe that it is only on this basis and on this condition that the concept of play can be reconstructed and reconciled with all of the-if you will-“deconstructive”-type notions, such as trace and writing … Once play is no longer simply play in the world, it is also no longer the play of someone who plays. Philosophy has always made play into an activity, the activity of a subject manipulating objects. As soon as one interprets play in the sense of playing, one has already been dragged into the space of classical philosophy where play is dominated by meaning, by its finality, and consequently by something that surpasses and orients it. In order to think of play in a radical way, perhaps one must think beyond the activity of a subject manipulating objects according to or against the rules, et cetera. (Derrida)

These sounds of language then are fixed in the
sub-conscious. What goes on inside we cannot see, but
the outer manifestations give us a guide. Sounds are
fixed and this is an integral part of the mother tongue.
We might call it an alphabet. Then syllables come,
then words, just spoken as a child will read sometimes
from a primer, without knowing what it all means. But
how intelligently the child works ! Inside the child him-
self is a little teacher, like one of the old-fashioned
teachers who make the child recite the alphabet, then
syllables and finally words. Only the human teacher
does it at the wrong time when the child already
possesses his language. The teacher inside the child
does things at the right time, so the baby fixes sounds,
then syllables. It is a gradual construction as logical as
the language. Afterwards words come and then we
enter the field of grammar. Names of things (nouns)
come first. That is why it is so illuminating to follow the
teachings of nature, because nature is a teacher, and it
teaches the child the most arid part of language. It is a
real school with methods.It teaches nouns and adjec-
tives, conjunctions and adverbs, verbs in the infinitive,
then the conjugation of verbs, the declensions of nouns,
then prefixes and suffixes and all the exceptions. Then
there is the examination ; he shows he can use them. We
then see what a good teacher there has been and what a
diligent pupil, because he uses them all quite correctly in
the examination. Isn’t he clever ? One should applaud
him, but no one takes any notice of him. Much later
when he is at the school we adults have chosen for him,
he is given a medal and we say ” What a clever teacher
he has “. (Montessori)

Time: the metonymy of the instantaneous, the possibility of the narrative magnetized by its own limit. The instantaneous in photography, the snapshot, would itself be but the most striking metonymy within the modern technological age of an older instantaneity. Older, even though it is never foreign to the possibility of techne in general. Remaining as attentive as possible to all the differences, one must be able to speak of a punctum of all signs (and all repetition or iterability already structures it), in any discourse, whether literary or not. As long as we do not hold to some naive and “realist” referentialism, it is the relation to some unique and irreplaceable referent that interests us and animates our most sound and studied readings: what took place only once, while dividing itself already, in the sights or in front of the lens of the Phaedo or Finnegan’s Wake, the Discourse on Method or Hegel’s Logic, John’s Apocalypse or Mallarme’s Coup de des. The photographic apparatus reminds us of this irreducible referential by means of a very powerful telescoping.
(Derrida)

But it is the small child who is really a living
miracle ! This is what the teacher should see in the
child : a pupil who has learnt in such a fashion that the
teacher herself could not learn better. In two years he
has learnt everything ! This is a deep mysterious fact.
Let us then follow the manifestations the child gives in
these two years, because thus it will be easier to follow
what the child has done. On examining these manifesta-
tions, we see a gradual and ever-awakening conscious-
ness and then, suddenly, this consciousness becomes
predominant and wishes to master all. At four months
(some say earlier, and 1 am inclined to agree with them)
the child perceives that this mysterious music that sur-
rounds him and touches him so deeply, comes from the
human mouth. It is the mouth (the lips that move) which
produces it. This is seldom noticed, but if we watch
a baby we see with what intensity he watches the
lips. Consciousness is already seen taking a hand in the
matter, for consciousness takes a propulsive part in the
work. Certainly, movement has been unconsciously pre-
pared, all the exact co-ordinations of minute fibres have
not been achieved consciously, but consciousness gives
interest, enlivens and makes a series of keen, alert
researches. (Montessori)

I shall proceed in a manner that some will find aphoristic or inadmissible, that others will accept as law, and that still others will judge to be not quite aphoristic enough. All will be listening to me with one or the other sort of ear (everything comes down to the ear you are able to hear me with) to which the coherence and continuity of my trajectory will have seemed evident from my first words (Derrida)

After two months of this observation of the mouth,
the child produces his own sounds (at six months of age).
All of a sudden, this baby, who has been unable to say
anything except an occasional interjectional noise, one
morning wakes up (before you) and you hear him saying :
*’ Ba-ba-ba “, ” Ma-ma-ma “, etc. It is he who invented
* Papa* and * Mama ‘. He now goes on for so long a time
with these syllables only that we say he cannot do any
more. After a great effort he has reached this. Let us re-
member, it is the effort of the ego who has made a
discovery and is conscious of his powers ; a little man
who is no longer a mechanism, but an individual using
mechanisms. We arrive at the end of the first year of
life, but before that, at ten months, the child has made
another discovery : that this language from the mouth of
people has a purpose. It is not merely music. When we
say : ” Dear little Baby, how sweet you are !”, he
realizes : ” this is meant for me” and so he begins to realize
there is some purpose in these sounds addressed to him.
Two things therefore have happened by the end of the
first year : in the depths of the unconscious he has under-
stood : on the heights of consciousness he has created
language, though at the moment it is only babbling, just
repeating sounds and combinations of sounds. (Montessori)

I understand that the place I am now occupying will not be left out of the exhibit or withdrawn from the scene. Nor do I intend to withold even that which I shall call, to save time, an autobiographical demonstration, although I must ask you to shift its sense a little and to listen to it with another ear.
(Derrida)

At one year of age the child says his first intentional
words. He babbles just the same, but it is intentional,
and intention means conscious intelligence. What has
happened within ? Having studied him we know that he
has much more within him than is shown by these un-
obtrusive manifestations. More and more the child has
realized that language refers to the environment round
him and he goes on to the conscious mastery of it. Here
a great struggle arises within the child, a struggle of con-
sciousness against mechanism. It is the first struggle of
man, it is the first war between the parts ! To illustrate
this I can use my own experience. I know many things,
I want to express them to an English-speaking
audience, but I do not have the language. I only know
a little English and my words would be a useless bab-
bling. I know that my audience is intelligent and we
could exchange ideas, but, alas, I only babble. This
epoch when the intelligence has many ideas and knows
people could understand them, but cannot express these
ideas through lack of language is a dramatic epoch in
the life of the child. It gives the first disappointments
of life. If I had no translator, what could I do ? He goes to school in his sub-
conscious, and his desire spurs him to learn. It is the
conscious impulse to be able to express himself that
makes this hurried acquisition of language possible.
Imagine his attention to language at this time !
(Montessori)

“… the contradictions (atopical:madness, extravagance, in Greek: atopos) of which we are speaking produces or registers the autodeconstruction in every concept, in the concept of concept: not only because hospitality undoes, should undo, the grip, the seizure, the capture, the force or the violence of the taking as comprehending, hospitality is, must be, owes itself to be, inconceivable and incomprehensible …” (Derrida)

The impulse forces him to take the language with exact-
ness, but we do not give it. Yet after one year of age
he could indeed go to school ; to one of our schools
where intelligent people talk to him intelligently. Some
people have understood this difficulty of the child between
one and two years, and the importance of giving to the
child the opportunity of learning exactly. Just a few
days before I wrote this, I received a communication
from Ceylon in which someone wrote : ” How glad we
are that there are now schools in our country for our
small child !” They have understood the need there. So
besides those who say : ” What a pity we have no
University ! ” there are also those who say : ” How glad
we are to have these schools for small children ! ” We
must realize that since the child has grammatical know-
ledge we can talk to him grammatically and help him
with the analysis of sentences. The new teachers of
children between the ages of one and two years should
know the development of language. Mothers must know
it, as it is important, and teachers should know it in a
scientific fashion. Then the child need not go about
to find people talking to others, not to himself, in order
to receive the aid he needs. We become the servants of
nature that creates, and of nature that teaches, and a
whole syllabus and method is ready for us. (Montessori)

That which returns is the constant affirmation, the “yes, yes” on which I insisted yesterday. That which signs here is in the form of a return, which is to say it has the form of something that cannot be simple. It is a selective return without negativity, or which reduces negativity through affirmation, through alliance or marriage (hymen), that is, through an affirmation that is also binding on the other or that enters into a pact with itself as other.
(Derrida)

What can I do with my babbling if 1 want to tell
something that is very important ? I may not have much
self-control, I may become agitated, enraged, and begin
to cry. That is what happens to the child of one or two
years. He wants to show by one word what he wants ua
to know, but he cannot and hence tantrums. Then people
say : ” See man’s innate perversity coming out ! ”
(What ! in a man of one year !) The origin of war is
there in this child of one year, who gets angry and violent
for no reason at all, as we think. We say : ” We care
for him, we dress him, we do things for him, yet he
makes all these naughty scenes “. Poor little man who
is working towards independence ! To be so misunder-
stood ! And yet this poor being who has no language
and whose only expression is one of rage, has yet the
power of making his own language. The rage is merely
an expression that comes after the obstructed effort to try
to make words, and he makes some sort of words.
(Montessori)

” Narcissism! There is not narcissism and non-narcissism; there are narcissisms that are more or less comprehensive, generous, open, extended. What is called non-narcissism is in general but the economy of a much more welcoming, hospitable narcissism, one that is much more open to the experience of the other as other. I believe that without a movement of narcissistic reappropriation, the relation to the other would be absolutedly destroyed, it would be destroyed in advance. The relation to the other – even if it remains asymmetrical, open, without possible reappropriation – must trace a movement of reappropriation in the image of oneself for love to be possible, for example. Love is narcissistic. Beyond that, there are little narcissisms, there are big narcissisms, and there is death in the end, which is the limit. Even in the experience – if there is one – of death, narcissism does not absolutely abdicate its power.” (Derrida)

There is another period at about one and a half
years when the child has recognized another fact ; namely,
that each object has a name. This is marvellous because
it means that among all the words he has heard, he has
been able to pick out nouns, especially concrete ones.
There was a world of objects, now there are words for
these objects. Unfortunately, with nouns alone one
cannot express everything, so he has to use one word
to express a whole idea. Psychologists therefore give
special attention to these words that are meant to express
sentences, and they call them fusive words or * one-word-
sentences.’ Let us suppose porridge is eaten with milk, the
child then may call out : ” Ma pa ” meaning : ” Mother
I am hungry, I want some porridge “. He is expressing
one whole sentence in a word. Another feature of this
fusive speech, this forced language of the child, is that
there are alterations in the words themselves ; there are
often abbreviations. A Spanish baby will use *
instead of paletot * which means ‘ overcoat * ; and
palda * for * espalda ‘ which means * shoulder \ This is
a modification, an abbreviation of the words We use, and
sometimes they are so different that we might say that
the child uses a foreign language. There is a * child-
language ‘, but very few take the trouble to study it.
Teachers of children of this age, should study this in
order to help the child and bring calm to his torment-
ed soul. (Montessori)

The point is that the eternal return is not a new metaphysics of time or of the totality of being, et cetera, on whose ground Nietzsche’s autobiographical
signature would come to stand like an empirical fact on a great ontological structure. (Here, one would have to take up again the Heideggerian interpretations of the eternal return and perhaps problematize them.) The eternal return always involves differences of forces that perhaps cannot be thought in terms of being, of the pair essence-existence, or any of the great metaphysical structures to which Heidegger would like to relate them. As soon as it crosses with the motif of the eternal return, then the individual signature, or, if you like,the signature of a proper name, is no longer simply an empirical fact grounded in something other than itself. (Derrida)

I have another instance, an incident that reveals that
a child of one and a half years can understand a whole
conversation and the sense of it. Some five people were
discussing the merits and demerits of a child’s story-book.
They had been discussing for some time, and the con-
versation ended with the remark : ” It all ends happily.”
Immediately the little one, who was in the room, began
to shout : ” Lola, lola ! ” The people thought it wanted
its nurse and was calling her by her name. But no ! It
became more agitated and cried in distress and rage, not
yet self-controlled, and then at last it managed to get
hold of the book and turning to the back cover pointed
to the picture of the child about whom the story was
written, and said again : ” Lola, lola ! ” The adults had
taken the end of the printed story as the end of the book,
but for the child the last picture, which was on the back
cover, was the end, and in that picture the child was cry-
ing : ” how could they say it ended happily ? ” It had
followed the whole conversation, knew it was about that
book, and had understood what was said and that a
mistake had been made by these adults. Its understand-
ing was complete and detailed, but its speech was not
sufficient. It could not even pronounce the correct word
for * cries * which is * llora ‘ in Spanish, so it said ‘ lola *.
The one word * lola ‘, was used to tell these adults :
44 You are wrong ; it does not end happily : he cries.” This illustrates why I say that it is necessary to have
a special ‘ school ‘ for children of the age of one and one
and a half years. Mothers, and society in general,
must take special care that the children have frequent
experiences of the best language. Let the child come
with us when we visit our friends and also when we
go to meetings, especially where people speak with
emphasis and clear enunciation. (Montessori)

the future has the form of a past which I will never have witnessed and which for this reason remains always promised – and moreover also multiple.(Derrida)